Russian disinformation reaches millions of Dutch-language readers via new route

In the run-up to the Dutch municipal elections, Russian disinformation reached the Dutch-language area via a new route. Investigative platform Justice for Prosperity mapped how a fabricated news story first launched around the German state elections and spread to a Dutch-language audience just one day later. Within a short time, it generated millions of views. It shows how foreign disinformation moves through Europe via existing networks and local amplifiers, and how quickly it can gain traction in the lead-up to Dutch elections as well.

The story did not surface in the Netherlands first, but in Germany. On 12 March, around the German state elections, a completely fabricated video appeared in Politico’s house style, carrying the false claim that Chancellor Merz had decided to take in 400,000 Palestinian refugees. The video bears the hallmarks of Storm-1516, a Russian disinformation operation that French intelligence agency VIGINUM links to military intelligence service GRU. The accompanying website, politico-24.com, was part of the deception. The domain was a forgery of the real Politico site and has since gone offline. A spokesperson for Axel Springer, Politico’s publisher, confirmed to news agency DPA that it was a fake website.

The same story reached the Dutch-language area one day later. On 13 March, Dutch website dissident.one picked it up, after which it spread further via Telegram groups including De Bataafse Leeuw, Gek Genoeg and Onafhankelijke Pers Nederland. On X, one post reached more than three million views and nearly 500 retweets. Storm-1516 created the content and built the stage. Dutch and Belgian users did the rest. One of them wrote: “Politico says so too.”

What launches in one country can flow rapidly through existing networks to the next, gaining credibility along the way.

This is not an isolated incident

Justice for Prosperity investigated Russian disinformation operations around elections in eight European countries between September 2025 and April 2026. In most countries, we identified the same approach: the same infrastructure, the same tactics, each time translated into local themes and national context. What begins in Germany can flow rapidly through existing networks to the next country. This case does not stand alone. It fits a broader operation spanning a wide European front.

Read the full report here

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In the run-up to the Dutch municipal elections, Russian disinformation also reached the Dutch-speaking region via a new route. Earlier in this report, we mapped out how a fake news story was launched surrounding the German state elections.