

Intelligence  
for Good

How social networks turn  
outrage into profit:

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# Polarisation as a business model

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Prosperity




# Polarisation as a business model

Every day, thousands of Dutch people see online posts that look like news but exist only to generate anger and hate. They come from coordinated networks of pages posing as news, sport or showbiz channels, largely run from abroad. One of the hubs of this network can be traced to Groningen. Hate and polarisation have become a business model. It feeds unrest and undermines our democracy.

The Justice for Prosperity Foundation (JfP) analysed **353,913** comments on **15,526** Facebook posts in an international network of **251** pages, divided into **15** larger groups. The picture is unambiguous: posts designed to provoke hate and anger are generated 24/7, purely to make money from advertising. The hate is aimed mainly at groups such as migrants and asylum seekers, and at individuals such as politicians. This content does not disappear into a vacuum. It feeds an online environment in which anger and distrust are stoked daily, with money as the driving force.

Most posts contain the call “read more in the comments”, after which a link takes the reader to a website filled with adverts. The more anger a post provokes, the more visitors reach the website and the more money is made. This is measurable. The most polarising posts attract roughly three times as many comments as neutral ones. On neutral posts, the Angry reaction accounts for **1** per cent of all reactions. On the polarising posts, that rises to **39** per cent. Both the text and the images are produced by AI. The content is easy to replicate and the costs stay low. The same mechanism runs simultaneously in multiple countries and languages.



In a one-week sample, JfP found **83,737** Angry reactions on the **251** selected pages, where fabricated content about foreigners and politicians is used to generate traction. Extrapolated to a full year, that amounts to over **4** million. And that anger almost always points in the same direction. On right-leaning<sup>1</sup> posts, **78%** of comments agree and only **4** per cent are critical. The sporadic left-leaning<sup>1</sup> posts show the reverse: they receive support in **15%** of cases.

Of the pages whose administrator location could be established, **85%** are run wholly or partly from abroad, mainly from Vietnam, followed by the United States, Ecuador, Armenia and Sweden. Countries in Africa and Asia also appeared. The hundreds of pages turn out to be in the

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<sup>1</sup> The political charge is coded on the basis of framing, which side a post reinforces or attacks, not on the basis of subject or party name. Classification followed fixed criteria and anchor examples, with a confidence score per label.




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hands of a small number of administrators, who direct their traffic to roughly seventy domains. Some of these are run from the Netherlands. From Groningen. JfP identified the owners.

JfP is now the first to map this phenomenon at scale and to show how the mechanism works. Earlier publications, for instance by Nieuwscheckers, described separate parts of it. The mechanism strikes at the heart of democratic debate. Anyone following these pages gets a distorted picture of what is going on in the Netherlands and can be influenced by it. Behind that picture lies no ideology, but a business model in which fuelling polarisation pays better than nuance.

## De Nederlandse TV: a Facebook page made in Vietnam



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# Social media as a news source

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


# Social media as a news source

Facebook has around 9.9 million users in the Netherlands. For many people, the platform is a daily source of news and context. In May 2026, a post appears on Facebook with a headline claiming that asylum seekers are harassing female joggers. Within days, the post has over 1,500 reactions. Almost 80 per cent of them are the "Angry" reaction 😡. Below it are another 1,290 comments.

The example does not stand alone. The same frame, of "jogging women" harassed by asylum seekers, appears far more often in our sample. Each page sends visitors through a link to a website filled with adverts. Together, these posts drew over **2,650** comments.

The images were created or edited with AI, and so were the texts. The source, for example, consists of **two** short TikTok clips. They show a boy with dark skin walking. Who he is, or where he comes from, remains unclear. Nothing in the clips points to his identity or origin. It is also claimed that the incident took place in Arnhem. JfP, however, places the landmarks in Cologne.



### “Vermin may be exterminated”

Under the post about the jogging women, someone wrote: "Vermin may be exterminated." That comment received **133** likes. The comments under posts like these are unrestrained. There is racism and xenophobia. Stereotypes are amplified and open death threats appear among them. JfP sees no trace of moderation, neither by the page administrators nor by Facebook.



That is striking, because a comment like "vermin may be exterminated" violates [Meta's own rules](#). The company prohibits comparing groups of people to animals or vermin and places this in the most severe category of hate speech. Yet the comment remains online, including its 133 likes, without any intervention. This pattern raises questions about compliance with the moderation obligations under the DSA, particularly around the handling of illegal content and systemic risks.

In early 2025, the company removed that classification of hate speech from its policy and stopped fact-checking.


JfP observes that this pattern does not stay in a vacuum. It contributes to the hardening of public debate, feeds distrust and drives people further apart. The motive is instrumental: division driven by a business model, not by conviction.



### Shared by Defend United

The pattern recurs in posts about asylum seekers' centres aimed at the Dutch 'market', each time placed by the same foreign account, operating under the name *La Think Thanh*. Groups such as Defend United pick up these posts and spread them among an audience that generates further traction. In this way, a narrative fabricated abroad amplifies unrest around asylum centres through a domestic intermediary.

JfP saw the same phenomenon earlier in research into disinformation during elections. Content from Russia passed through other countries, such as Germany, before it reached Dutch voters. That detour obscures the origin and gives the narrative the appearance of an organic, local source. With *La Think Thanh* and *Defend United* it works no differently: foreign content acquires a local face through a relay station.



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# The business model in four steps:



# How it works

## The business model in four steps:

### 1. A seemingly normal Facebook page is launched

The page presents itself as a news, sport or showbiz page and gathers followers with neutral posts. Followers may be bought at the start, to give the page an appearance of legitimacy.

### 2. Then comes content that plays on emotion

Groups such as migrants and asylum seekers, and individuals such as politicians, are the most used subjects. JfP's data show that precisely these posts draw the most comments. The picture varies from page to page, but the line is the same everywhere: more negative and polarising posts lead to greater reach. This is consistent with existing research<sup>2</sup>.

### 3. A link takes the user to a website with adverts

**Almost every post ends with a call like "Read more in the comments 📌". The link leads to a website filled with adverts. That is where the money is: every visitor generates ad impressions. More emotion means more traction, more visitors and therefore more revenue.**

### 4. The Facebook user does the rest

Anyone who comments, shares or reacts with an emoji puts the post in the timeline of their own friends. That is how the hateful posts spread further and visitor numbers rise.

## Advertising revenue

How much these pages earn exactly is hard to establish without access to the bidding processes of ad auction platforms. More important than the amount is the margin. The cost of creating the content is negligible. The traction also comes free of charge, driven organically by the energy of emotions such as hate and anger. That makes almost every euro earned pure profit.

Moreover, the market is larger than the Netherlands alone. The same mechanism runs in parallel in dozens of countries and languages. The Dutch figures are therefore a fraction of the real proceeds.

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<sup>2</sup> Brady et al. (2017) showed, on 563,312 posts, that each additional moral-emotional word increases diffusion by around 20%. Rathje, Van Bavel and Van der Linden (2021) found that posts targeting the political out-group are shared roughly twice as often. See: Brady et al., "Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks", PNAS 114(28), 2017; Rathje et al., "Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media", PNAS 118(26), 2021.



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# An infrastructure of hate

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# An infrastructure of hate


Contempt and anger dominate the comments under the posts. Racism and threats are common. Nothing suggests these comments come from bot networks. They are real people with personal accounts. Their anger is deliberately stoked by administrators who are largely based abroad. Precisely because that anger is so massive and so uniform, JfP examined the comments systematically.

Of the **353,913** comments placed under the posts in one week, JfP analysed **44,335**. More than **65%** of these were negative, classified as contempt or anger. That amounts to over **28,000** comments in a single week. This analysis covers only part of the total. The full dataset contains **83,737** Angry reactions in that same week. Extrapolated to a full year, that comes to over **4 million** 😡 Angry reactions. And that is apart from all the hateful, racist remarks written in the comments. It shows the scale and intensity of the emotion generated here.

## A selection of comments from a single week:

- “Just shoot them - they add nothing to society anyway, they only cost money” (**243** likes)
- “Well done, spend the money on the homeless instead, they need it more than those parasites eating our country bare” (**219** likes)
- “Close the borders and abolish family reunification!” (**325** likes)

## The emotional tone of the comments:



## Polarising content


The degree of emotion differs per subject. That is where the deliberate content strategy becomes visible. Posts about politics and asylum together account for the vast majority of all comments, followed by crime and (in)security. These are also the most polarising themes. An average post about asylum seekers scores over **4** on a polarisation scale of **5**, while light subjects stay around one and a half.

Posts about Dutch showbiz are published most often, but yield fewer than eight comments on average. For posts about asylum and politics, the figure is over **forty, five to six times** as many. Of the **251** pages examined, **170** post both Dutch showbiz news and posts about asylum, politics and crime.

The latest news about the singer Jan Smit, for example, brings in the followers, but the polarising posts are the business model. In addition, a smaller group focuses almost entirely on asylum, politics and crime. These **25** pages, a **tenth** of the total in the sample JfP studied, together account for **22%** of all comments.

It is precisely the emotionally charged subjects that get the most reach. And reach is what these networks run on. The hate under the posts is no accident. The “content creators” select the most polarising themes with the sole aim of provoking as much emotion as possible.

## Comments by theme:



## The political posts are predominantly right-leaning

Of the posts with a clear political charge, roughly **88%** lean “right”. That one-sidedness is not caused by a small number of pages with large audiences skewing the figures. All networks examined, and all but one of the pages with enough political content, lean to the right.


Around asylum and politics, the ratio between left and right is already clearly out of balance. For crime it rises to roughly **20:1**. It is precisely the posts serving visitors on the right flank of the political spectrum that attract the most comments. They make up only a quarter of all posts published, but account for more than half of all Angry emoji 🤔. Under a post with that signature, the tone is mostly approving. Under a rare “left” post, the tone immediately turns negative. Anyone reading the comments sees the same opinion again and again, and may conclude that the whole of the Netherlands thinks that way. That is the false consensus effect: anyone repeatedly presented with a one-sided stream of posts overestimates how widely their own view is shared.<sup>3</sup>

## The networks are growing fast

JfP established the creation date of every Facebook page. The data show rapid scaling over the past **two** years, with a clear rise from **2024**. In **2024**, **50** Dutch pages were added. In **2025**, that rose to **142**.

The creation date tells only part of the story. Many pages have existed for years under a different name. Often run from abroad, and only later given a Dutch identity. JfP found, for example, that a page named “*Xtylo jam shahrukh 6691*” was later renamed “*Nieuws & Verhalen*”. This allowed JfP to reconstruct when each page actually started targeting a Dutch audience.

## From dormant network to 251 pages



<sup>3</sup> Luzsa & Mayr (2021) demonstrated experimentally that exposure to a one-sided social media feed increases the estimated public support for one's own opinion. See: *Luzsa & Mayr, "False consensus in the echo chamber"*, *Cyberpsychology* 15(1), 2021.



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
**The operation is  
largely run from  
abroad**



# The operation is largely run from abroad

JfP established the administrator location for all 251 pages in the sample. For 85 per cent of the 251 pages, at least one administrator is based abroad. A Facebook page run entirely from the Netherlands is the exception.

251 Dutch Facebook pages run from 32 countries.




## Technical investigation

Other signals also point to Vietnam. Some of the sites are registered under the .vn domain, Vietnam's country extension. On the websites themselves, the origin is sometimes visible too. Article URLs, for example, contain recurring names that look Vietnamese, such as "*uyenhoanh*", "*thanhtam*" and "*ngocanh*". These are presumably the accounts that post the articles. Several websites also tag their visitor traffic with a campaign code containing such a Vietnamese name. The Facebook administrator locations, the domain registrations and the names in the article URLs all point in the same direction.



## For 85 per cent of the 251 pages, at least one administrator is based abroad



### The Groningen network

Although most of the pages are run from abroad, there are also Dutch nationals using hate and polarisation as a business model. The clearest example is a network operating from Groningen.

Through OSINT research, JfP identified the owners of the Groningen network. They are a young couple, operating from their home, at which several companies are registered, who registered the pages and associated websites there through a holding company. The network comprises **21** active Facebook pages with over **620,000** followers combined, directing traffic to **seven** websites. The pages' users see highly polarising posts every day, without knowing that behind the pages are in reality two people who run everything almost fully automated.

JfP also looked further back for this network than the single week of data collected for the broad investigation. For **one** of the network's pages, JfP retrieved the complete history. This concerns an analysis of **10,171** posts from October **2023** to February **2026**. The data show how a page has evolved over time. In October **2023**, not a single post contained political content and the polarisation score was zero. The page presented itself as an innocent humour and lifestyle page. **Two** years later, in October **2025**, the month of the Dutch general election, more than half of all posts were political or polarising in nature. That shift was gradual and appears deliberate. The growth followed the political calendar. In the spring of **2025**, the page published an average of twelve posts per day; after NSC left the cabinet in August, that rose to over **21** posts per day. On 29 October, election day, the page published **26** posts. Together they drew **32,825** comments. That is over **five** times the daily average. The underlying choice shows in the



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numbers: a politically charged subject yields this network on average **3.4** times as much interaction. A post about Islam and religion as much as **4.3** times. Posts that score well are repeated. Of the more than **10,000** posts, over **2,300** were reposted verbatim. Content that generated heavy traffic before is deployed again. Pure profit-seeking. The posts appeared **seven** days a week and only between 06:00 and 23:00.

This investigation into the Groningen network reinforces JfP's findings. With years of data, it shows what **one** week also showed. A method that deliberately steers towards polarisation, simply because anger and contempt earn more than nuance.

### The response of the Groningen network

Dear Sir or Madam,

Thank you for your message and for the opportunity to respond.

The activities you refer to concern digital media platforms focused on news, entertainment and current topics for a broad online audience. Like many other online media platforms, such websites use technology and automation to publish content efficiently.

The purpose of these platforms is to offer accessible online content to their target audience. It is emphatically not the intention to encourage social polarisation or to spread disinformation.

We would also like to stress that the individuals involved hold no public office. We therefore assume that any publications will contain no personal or identifiable details of individuals.

Kind regards




## 203 stand-alone Facebook pages fall under 15 larger networks

At first glance, the **hundreds** of Facebook pages appear independent of one another. They have different names, their own design and cover a range of subjects. One characteristic exposes their underlying cohesion: the link placed in the comments that takes the reader to a website with adverts. JfP classified every page by landing page. Pages that appear to have nothing in common turn out to arrive at the same web address.

The largest cluster comprises **thirty** separate pages, each with its own name and design. They send their traffic to **one** and the same domain: primeanglenews.com. **Eighteen** others converge on travel2days.com. Fourteen on vietwedding.net, and in this way at least **15** such networks emerge. In total, the **hundreds** of pages examined lead to over seventy destinations. Other signals point to an even smaller number of networks, but that cannot be substantiated with the same certainty.

Behind each cluster of pages, in all likelihood, stands **one** owner. What presents itself as **hundreds** of independent Dutch news and showbiz pages is in reality the work of a considerably smaller number of actors.



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# Why this investigation matters

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# The undermining of social cohesion

**A healthy democracy rests in part on the assumption that what people say to each other contains some truth or sincerity: real concerns, real experiences, genuine differences of opinion between ordinary citizens. Whoever comments on the Facebook posts described here is usually a Dutch person with a sincere opinion about asylum, migration or the government. The problem does not lie with those visitors. It lies with the actors who deliberately stoke and amplify these emotions, not out of ideology, but because hate simply sells better than nuance.**

That mechanism erodes public debate itself. Anyone following these pages gets a distorted picture of events and prevailing opinions. On posts with a right-wing signature, the vast majority of comments support the framing and hardly anyone speaks out against it, creating the impression that an overwhelming majority of the Dutch think the same way. That unanimity is largely artificial. A handful of pages selects, repeats and frames until a particular voice appears overwhelming.

The danger lies in what that does to large groups of people. They are drawn in with a genuine sense of discontent and then made angrier, step by step, by administrators to whom the content itself does not matter. The tone of the comments is overwhelming and hateful. Earlier in this report we described that more than 65% of the comments examined can be classified as contempt or anger.

The timing is no coincidence either. These pages first stood out during monitoring around the Dutch general election, and again around the municipal elections: precisely the periods when public debate runs hottest.

We do not establish that this influenced an election result, nor that individual users' opinions were changed by it.<sup>4</sup> We do establish that open and honest debate stands less of a chance under these posts, and that the picture the user receives is structurally manipulated.

There is no ideology behind this, nor a foreign state seeking to destabilise the Netherlands. Making money appears to be the sole motive: hate is commercially more attractive than nuance. That does not make the business model any less dangerous. It comes at the cost of mutual trust between Dutch people, of social cohesion and of the quality of the debate that keeps a democracy running.

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<sup>4</sup> Eady et al. (2023) found, for the Russian IRA campaign on Twitter in 2016, no demonstrable link with changes in opinions or voting behaviour; exposure was also highly concentrated. Our claim does not concern attitude change, but the production of a distorted picture and the erosion of the quality of the debate. Eady et al., *Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency foreign influence campaign on Twitter in the 2016 US election*, Nature Communications 14, 2023.



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# Recommendations

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**The tap must be turned off and the target made more resilient. Whoever wants to stop this mechanism must apply pressure on both the money flow and the platform. Advertising networks make the websites profitable. Under the Digital Services Act, platforms have obligations to curb coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Nationally, there is a third lever: whoever poses as a news site but in reality funnels traffic to adverts may be acting in breach of the rules against unfair commercial practices. Consumers must also become more resilient. The recommended measures follow below.**

#### **For consumers:**

**Check the source:** Click on the name of the Facebook page. Go to “Page transparency” and see from which countries the administrators operate. A foreign administrator location is not always a problem, but for a Dutch “news” page it is an important signal.

**Be alert to “read more in the comments” posts:** On these Facebook channels, this almost always means a referral to websites filled with adverts. A story that can only be reached through such a link, on a site full of adverts, is rarely real journalism.

**Do not comment or share, and block the page:** Every comment, share or emoji puts the post in other people's timelines, which is exactly what the page is after. Unfollowing and blocking the page is the most direct way to shrink its reach.

#### **For the government and the House of Representatives**

**Put this mechanism on the European Commission's agenda:** The DSA obliges “Very Large Online Platforms” (VLOPs) to assess the risks of coordinated inauthentic behaviour and threats to civic discourse. The Commission can open investigations into compliance based on signals from researchers and citizens. A concrete step: press for genuine DSA enforcement and bring this to the Commission's attention. This investigation and our data, which we will make available for that purpose, provide the evidence.

**Put pressure on the advertising networks:** The business model stands or falls with networks such as Google AdSense. Shared advertising accounts and AI content disguised as news are concrete starting points for parliamentary questions and European pressure. JfP can supply the necessary data on request.

#### **For regulators**

For the networks based in the Netherlands, such as the Groningen network, there is an additional lever: consumer law. They conceal who is behind the site and package an advertising site as a news website. That may, for example, constitute a misleading commercial practice under Article 6:193g of the Dutch Civil Code, which prohibits concealing essential information about the identity of the trader. The **Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)** is the designated regulator to investigate this. JfP will also share additional data for this purpose.

#### **For education and media literacy**

**Critical thinking:** Make citizens aware that much of what they see online is designed to generate emotion. This also belongs in education, with real examples, so that young people learn to recognise how anger is sold. JfP is investing in this by developing new kinds of teaching methods, among others with the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision.



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# Methodology and dataset

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# How JfP investigated this phenomenon

**For this investigation, JfP analysed one complete, unfiltered week of around 250 suspect pages. These pages are divided into some 15 larger networks. That yielded over 15,000 posts. Under these posts, over 350,000 comments were placed. Using a full week without preselection produces a representative picture.**

Each post was classified with the help of an AI model on theme, political direction, tone and degree of polarisation. The model reads both the text and the image and assesses the underlying message, not just the surface keywords. The results were checked against manually labelled samples.

From those same posts, JfP also examined part of the comments. JfP used a targeted sample: a broad measurement across **thousands** of posts for a fair comparison, supplemented by a deep measurement of the largest viral discussions. In total, over **44,000** comments were collected and assessed on sentiment, on their stance towards the page's frame and on emotion. Anger is measured in two ways that confirm each other: through Facebook's own "Angry" reaction 😡 and through the language people use in the comments.

JfP mapped the coordination between pages in **three** ways. The strongest signal came from the websites: which pages send their traffic to the same advertising websites? Seemingly separate pages could be linked to each other this way. JfP also looked at shared content: identical or near-identical images, the same story in rewritten form and text copied verbatim. Finally, JfP used Facebook's official page transparency, which records for each page who the administrators are and from which country they operate.

For **one** network, JfP carried out further, in-depth research. JfP conducted an OSINT investigation into that network, which traced the owners to a couple in Groningen. JfP also retrieved the entire history of **one** of the network's pages, to show how a page evolves over time from innocent content to systematic polarisation.

JfP does not conduct academic research, but OSINT research with its own evidentiary standard: two independent sources per finding, explicit confidence levels, and factual findings kept separate from interpretation. Where we describe a working mechanism, we test it against existing scientific research; where we establish facts, they rest on our own, verifiable evidence.



# The dataset

**For this investigation, JfP built an extensive dataset. A set that, beyond the findings in this report, offers rich opportunities for follow-up research.**

The core is one unfiltered week of posts with over **731,000** emoji reactions, almost **354,000** comments and **28,000** shares, from **251** Facebook pages with **15,526** posts. The image of virtually every post was saved as well. An AI model assessed both the text and the image of each post and classified them by theme, political colour, polarisation score and tone.

In addition, for over **4,600** posts, the more than **44,000** comments were collected, each labelled by sentiment, stance towards the page's frame, and emotional tone. For the **22** most viral discussions, up to **500** comments per post were retrieved; for the other selected posts, the **twenty** most relevant.

For each page, JfP holds the official Facebook transparency data: administrator location by country, ownership information, creation date and the full name history. For the page from the Groningen network, the post history goes back to October **2023**, with more than **10,000** posts spanning over **two** years.

Finally, for all **67** identified advertising domains, JfP mapped the technical infrastructure: advertising accounts, registration data and hosting clusters. These data were not included in the final analysis.



## About Justice for Prosperity

The Justice for Prosperity Foundation (JfP) is an independent research and detection platform based in Amsterdam that exposes and helps counter social manipulation and subversive threats. We investigate how actors organise online and offline, which networks, narratives, drivers and business models lie behind them, and how they put pressure on democratic processes and institutions, social cohesion and fundamental rights.

From within international civil society, JfP works with citizens, journalists, knowledge institutions, governments and civil society partners. We connect digital research with our offline fieldwork, security analysis and strategic interpretation. In doing so, we make visible which actors exert influence unseen, which tactics they use, how messages spread and what effect they aim for.

We translate those insights into threat and risk profiles, security strengthening and strategic support for organisations and institutions that want to increase their resilience. Our greatest focus, however, is on helping to strengthen social resilience through education, training and alliance-building.

### For more information and contact:

Join us and support our independent research [here](#) or go to our website [www.justiceforprosperity.org](http://www.justiceforprosperity.org)

For tips and for sharing source material: [Safesend.justiceforprosperity.org](mailto:Safesend.justiceforprosperity.org) (also reachable via Tor).


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